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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE--MIRANDA WARNINGS-WAIVER OF
RIGHT To COUNSEL AT POLYGRAPH TEST. Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S.
Ct. 394 (1982).
On September 21, 1974, Edward Fields was charged with rape.
Four days later, on September 25, the defendant was arrested and
released on his own recognizance. After discussing the case with
both his private counsel and counsel furnished by the military,' the
defendant requested and was granted a polygraph examination
which was to be conducted by the Army. Prior to the examination
the defendant signed a written waiver which informed him of his
rights.2 He was also read an additional detailed statement of his
rights but declined to have an attorney present.' At the conclusion
of the polygraph test, the examiner told the defendant that the test
results indicated that he had been deceitful and asked the defendant
to explain. The defendant then admitted to sexual intercourse with
the victim but claimed that she had consented. He agreed to speak
to another army officer and the police chief of Waynesville, Mis-
souri, the town where the alleged incident occurred. The chief ad-
vised the defendant of his rights again and the defendant repeated
that he had had sexual intercourse with the victim, but that it was
with her consent.
The defendant sought to suppress these admissions of inter-
1. Defendant was a soldier in the U.S. Army and was stationed at Fort Leonard
Wood, Missouri.
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), provides that prior to custodial interroga-
tion a person must be advised of his right to remain silent, that anything he says will be used
against him, that he has a right to have counsel present before and during any questioning,
and that if he cannot afford counsel it will be provided for him.
3. The Army agent conducting the test read the defendant the following statement:
Before I ask you any questions you must understand your rights. You do not have
to answer my questions or say anything. Anything you say or do can be used as
evidence against you in a criminal trial. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before
questioning or have a lawyer present with you during the questioning. This lawyer
can be a civilian lawyer of your own choice, or a military lawyer, detailed for you
at no expense to you. Also, you may ask for a military lawyer of your choice by
name and he will be detailed for you if superiors determine he's reasonably avail-
able. If you are now going to discuss the offense under investigation, which is rape,
with or without a lawyer present, you have a right to stop answering questions at
any time or speak to a lawyer before answering further, even if you do sign a
waiver certificate. Do you want a lawyer at this time?
State v. Fields, 538 S.W.2d 348, 350 n.l (Mo. App. 1976).
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course as violating his fifth amendment rights.4 The trial court de-
nied the motion and held that the defendant had waived his rights.
He was convicted of rape and sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on
the ground that the defendant had waived his rights.5  The defend-
ant sought a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The district court denied
the writ and held that the defendant had waived his rights. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and
remanded,7 holding that the defendant had not waived his rights
because he had not been first informed of them at a meaningful
time. On writ of certiorari the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that the defendant had been sufficiently informed
of his right to have counsel present and had made a valid waiver of
the right. Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982). 9
At early common law, confessions were admissible regardless
of how they were obtained. There were no restrictions and even
those confessions obtained by torture were admissible at trial."° In
the latter eighteenth century the principle emerged that confessions
obtained by promise or threat should not be admissible. This prin-
ciple was expressed in King v. Warickshall,'1 where the court stated
that no credit should be given to "a confession forced from the mind
by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear .. ,,12 The pur-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in pertinent part that "No person .. .shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."
5. The court stated that the defendant "had been repeatedly and amply advised of his
rights and that he voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights." State v.
Fields, 538 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Mo. App. 1976).
6. The district court agreed with the Missouri Court of Appeals that the defendant had
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Wyrick v. Fields, 103
S. Ct. 394, 395 (1982).
7. The court ordered the state to either release the defendant or give him a new trial.
Fields v. Wyrick, 682 F.2d 154, 162 (8th Cir. 1982).
8. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires the warnings to be given at a
meaningful time before the fifth amendment rights may be waived. The court of appeals
held that Miranda warnings were required before any post-test interrogation. Since the
warnings were not given, the defendant could not make a valid waiver of his fifth amend-
ment rights. The court of appeals thus held that the post-test statements were obtained in
violation of the defendant's right against self incrimination and were inadmissible. Fields v.
Wyrick, 682 F.2d 154, 160-61 (8th Cir. 1982).
9. Based on the standards for waiver the Supreme Court announced here, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals on remand affirmed the district court decision that a valid waiver
had occurred. Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 556 (1983).
10. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818, at 292 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).
11. 1 Leach C.L. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (K.B. 1783).
12. Id. at 264, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235.
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pose of this evolving principle was to exclude confessions which
were not trustworthy.' 3 Physical evidence discovered as a result of
the inadmissible confession was still admissible because the evi-
dence was trustworthy.' 4 Facts obtained by the inadmissible confes-
sion, which could be proven without the confession, were also
admissible because the facts were trustworthy. 5
Several tests developed to determine the trustworthiness of con-
fessions. In Regina v. Moore16 a confession was held to be untrust-
worthy if induced by promise of benefit or threat of harm by
someone with authority over the prisoner. Similarly, in Regina v.
Garner'7 the court held that a confession would be untrustworthy if
it had been given involuntarily. In Garner voluntariness was deter-
mined by whether there had been inducement to confess. ' 8 Regard-
less of the formal test used, the decision of whether a confession was
trustworthy and thus admissible was based mainly on whether it
was obtained by promise of benefit or threat of harm. 9 Since the
purpose of the common law rules on confessions was to exclude un-
reliable evidence, even those confessions obtained by deceit were
admissible as long as they were trustworthy.2 °
In early American cases the Supreme Court adopted the Eng-
lish view that unreliable confessions should be excluded from trial.2'
The Court based its rules on English precedent.22 In Hopt v. Utah23
the Supreme Court held a confession admissible because it was not
induced by promise of benefit or threat of harm and, thus was con-
sidered trustworthy. Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court
followed the inducement doctrine for determining trustworthiness
and admissibility of confessions.24
In Brain v. United States25 the Court deviated from the induce-
13. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 818, at 297.
14. In Warickshall stolen property which was found as a result of the defendant's inad-
missible confession was held admissible. Warickshall, I Leach C.L. 263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234
(K.B. 1783).
15. Id. at 264, 168 Eng. Rep. at 235.
16. 2 Den. C. C. 522, 169 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ct. Crim. App. 1852).
17. 1 Den. C. C. 329, 169 Eng. Rep. 267 (Ct. Crim. App. 1848).
18. Id. at 331-32, 169 Eng. Rep. at 268.
19. Id.
20. See Commonwealth v. Cressinger, 193 Pa. 326, 44 A. 433 (1899).
21. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S. 355 (1896); Sparfv. United States, 156 U.S. 51
(1895).
25. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
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ment test and held that the admissibility of confessions came under
the fifth amendment right against self incrimination. The test which
the Court applied was whether the confession was voluntarily
made.2 6 Thus, Brain established a constitutional standard for judg-
ing admissibility of confessions at the federal level. After Brain the
admissibility of confessions was no longer based solely on the in-
ducement test of trustworthiness. In Ziang Sun Wan v. United
States27 the Supreme Court rejected the inducement test and, citing
Brain, held that admissibility of confessions at the federal level was
based on whether the confession was voluntarily given.28
While the voluntariness standard was the test for admissibility
of confessions in federal cases, the Court applied a fourteenth
amendment due process standard when determining admissibility of
confessions in cases arising from state courts.29 The fourteenth
amendment due process standard was based on whether confessions
were obtained by methods that violated fundamental fairness and
due process. The purpose of the due process standard was to pre-
vent the use of evidence, whether true or false, that had been un-
fairly obtained.30 The Court, while having separate tests for cases
from federal and state courts, used a combination of both in decid-
ing subsequent cases.3 1 In Lyons v. Oklahoma ,32 the Court indicated
that a confession must be voluntary to meet the due process test.33
The Supreme Court in this way merged the two standards into one
and used this due process voluntariness standard in cases from both
state and federal courts.
34
The McNabb-Mallory rule35 changed the standard for deciding
the admissibility of confessions at the federal level. McNabb v.
United States36 held that a defendant's confession was inadmissible
when made during a violation of the defendant's right to be taken
promptly before a magistrate as required by federal statute. State-
26. Id. at 542-43.
27. 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
28. Id. at 14-15.
29. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219
(1941); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
30. Lisenba, 314 U.S. at 236.
31. Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 961 (1966).
32. 322 U.S 596 (1944).
33. Id. at 601-602.
34. Developments in the Law, Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 961 (1966).
35. The rule developed from a line of cases beginning with McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943) and ending with Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
36. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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ments which before would have been admissible based on the vol-
untariness standard were now inadmissible if obtained during this
period of illegal detention. In Mallory v. United States37 the Court
reaffirmed McNabb and held that failure to comply with the de-
fendant's right to prompt arraignment would render any confession
obtained during the period of illegal detention inadmissible.38 The
McNabb-Mallory rule was applied in a number of both Supreme
Court and lower federal court cases.
39
The Supreme Court did not incorporate the McNabb-Mallory
rule on the state level, and state courts for the most part did not take
it upon themselves to adopt the McNabb-Mallory rule.4" In fact,
several states expressly held that McNabb-Mallory was inapplicable
at the state level4' and only a few state courts expressly adopted this
rule.42
Rather than incorporate the McNabb-Mallory rule on the state
level, the Supreme Court began developing rules for admissibility of
confessions in state cases by applying the fifth amendment right
against self incrimination4 3 and the sixth amendment right to coun-
sel to the states. 44
The cases which developed standards for complying with the
defendant's fifth and sixth amendment rights began with Escobedo v.
Illinois.45 In Escobedo the Supreme Court held that the right to
counsel attached when the defendant became the focus of an inves-
tigation and this right to counsel would be violated if the defendant
37. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
38. Id. at 452-53. By the time Mallory was decided the statute requiring prompt ar-
raignment had become FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
39. See Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S.
532 (1947); Carignan v. United States, 185 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1950); Akowskey v. United
States, 158 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Runnels v. United States, 138 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1943);
United States v. Hoffman, 137 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1943); United States v. Haupt, 136 F.2d
661 (7th Cir. 1943).
40. 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 862a, at 623.
41. See Ingram v. State, 252 Ala. 497, 42 So.2d 36 (1949); State v. Browning, 206 Ark.
791, 178 S.W.2d 77 (1944); State v. Boudreau, 67 Nev. 36, 214 P.2d 135 (1950); State v.
Bunk, 4 N.J. 461, 73 A.2d 249 (1950); State v. Nagel, 75 N.D. 495, 28 N.W.2d 665 (1947);
State v. Folkes, 174 Or. 568, 150 P.2d 17 (1944); State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P.2d
559 (1951).
42. Vorhauer v. State, 59 Del. 35, 212 A.2d 886 (1965); People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich.
410, 102 N.W.2d 738 (1960). Connecticut adopted the rule by statute in CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 54-1C (West 1962).
43. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
44. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1983] 439
UALR LAW JOURNAL
was taken into custody, interrogated, and denied counsel.46 Once
the right to counsel had been violated, statements were inadmissible
regardless of whether voluntary under the traditional voluntariness
test.47
Escobedo created several questions: Whether the defendant
had to request counsel for the Escobedo rationale to come into
play;48 whether the defendant had to be advised of his right to coun-
sel;49 whether the defendant had to be advised of his right to remain
silent;50 and whether the defendant must be advised of the fact that
anything he said might be used against him.51
The questions created by Escobedo and disputed by the courts
were all answered in favor of the suspect in Miranda v. Arizona .52
Miranda held that prior to custodial interrogation a suspect must be
advised of his right to remain silent," that anything he says will be
used against him in court,5 4 that he has the right to consult with a
lawyer and have the lawyer with him during interrogation,55 and
that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.
5 6
Miranda established these warnings as a prerequisite to custodial
interrogation in order to protect the defendant's fifth amendment
right against self incrimination.57 Prior to Miranda these warnings
were a factor in determining the voluntariness and admissibility of a
46. Id. at 491.
47. Id.
48. For cases answering in the affirmative see United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448
(7th Cir. 1965); Sturgis v. State, 235 Md. 343, 201 A.2d 681 (1964); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25,
398 P.2d 251 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 51lb, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964). For cases
answering in the negative see Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1965); People v. Do-
rado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).
49. For cases answering in the affirmative see People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398
F.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965); State v. Neely, 239 Or. 494, 398 P.2d 482 (1965). For
cases answering in the negative see People v. Hartgraves, 31 I11. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33
(1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
50. For cases answering in the affirmative see United States ex rel Kemp v. Pate, 359
F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1966); People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169
(1965). For cases answering in the negative see People v. Hartgraves, 31 11. 2d 375, 202
N.E.2d 33 (1964); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398 P.2d 251 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis. 2d
5lib, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964).
51. For a case answering in the affirmative see United States ex rel Kemp v. Pate, 359
F.2d 749 (7th cir. 1966). For a case answering in the negative see Green v. State, 236 Md.
334, 203 A.2d 870 (1964).
52. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
53. Id. at 467-68.
54. Id. at 469.
55. Id. at 471.
56. Id. at 473.
57. Id. at 476.
440 [Vol. 6:435
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statement under the voluntariness standard. 58 Miranda held that
any statement obtained by custodial interrogation without these
warnings first being given was inadmissible regardless of whether
voluntary. 59 After these warnings had been given, the defendant
could then waive his rights and make a statement.6 °
Voluntariness, while no longer the test for the admissibility of
the statement itself after Escobedo and Miranda, was now the test
for determining the validity of the waiver. 6' The voluntariness of
the waiver was determined by the totality of the circumstances.62
Although not required, an express waiver was evidence going to the
totality of the circumstances.63
Miranda further held that there was no distinction with regard
to admissibility between full confessions, incriminating statements,
or even those statements which could be argued to be exculpatory.64
None of the defendant's statements could be used by the prosecu-
tion if obtained in violation of the requirement that the Miranda
warnings be given prior to custodial interrogation and the fifth
amendment rights validly waived.65
Under the Miranda decision, once the defendant invoked his
right to silence all interrogation must cease.66 Once the suspect in-
yoked his right to have counsel present all interrogation must cease
until counsel was present. 67 This requirement created the question
of if and under what circumstances, interrogation could be resumed.
The Court dealt with this question in Michigan v. Mosley.68 In Mos-
ley the Court held that the right to remain silent must be "scrupu-
lously honored, ' ' 69 and when the right had been so honored, a
statement subsequently obtained would be admissible and would
58. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 511 (1963).
59. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 476.
62. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
(1979); Johnson v. Zerbs, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Richardson v. State, 632 S.W.2d 700 (Tex.
1982).
63. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § 140.8 commentary c, 368 (1975) adopted the view that an express
waiver should be required for a defendant to make a valid waiver of his fifth amendment
rights.
64. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
65. Id. at 476-77.
66. Id. at 473-74.
67. Id. at 474.
68. 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
69. Id. at 104.
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not violate the right to remain silent.70
The Supreme Court further developed the rules for admissibil-
ity of confessions in Edwards v. Arizona.7  In Edwards the Court
held that once the right to counsel had been invoked, it could still be
waived and the suspect could make a statement without counsel
present. The waiver still had to be voluntary, knowing, and intelli-
gent based on the totality of the circumstances, and the defendant
must have reinitiated the dialogue leading to the waiver.7 2 Under
Edwards an attempted waiver would be invalid if the suspect was
not the one who reinitiated the dialogue after the Miranda warnings
had been given and the right to have counsel present was invoked.
A subsequently obtained statement would be inadmissible even
when the waiver of the right to have counsel present was otherwise
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent if the dialogue was not reini-
tiated by the defendant after the right to have counsel present was
invoked.73 Once the defendant did reinitiate the dialogue after the
right to have counsel present had been invoked, a subsequent
waiver was judged by the totality of the circumstances just as a court
would judge a waiver made prior to the right being invoked."
Wyrick v. Fields75 was another step in the Supreme Court's de-
velopment and clarification of the rules pertaining to the admissibil-
ity of confessions. Wyrick held that once a defendant had
reinitiated the dialogue as required by Edwards, had received his
Miranda warnings, and had made a valid waiver of his right to have
counsel present at a polygraph test, the same waiver would be valid
for post-test interrogation as long as the waiver was still voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent.76 Under Wyrick, a new set of Miranda
warnings are not required prior to the post-test interrogation when
the warnings have been given prior to the test and the waiver is still
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.77
In holding that the defendant had made a valid waiver of his
right to have counsel present during the post-test interrogation, the
70. Id. After the defendant in Mosley invoked his right to remain silent, the interroga-
tion was ended. The defendant was later advised of his rights again by different officers with
regard to a completely different crime and he confessed. The latter confession was held
admissible. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
71. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
72. Id. at 486 n.9.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 103 S. Ct. 394 (1982).
76. Id. at 396.
77. Id. at 396-97.
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Court based its reasoning on several previous Court decisions.78
The Court reasoned that the defendant had initiated the encounter
including both the polygraph test and the post-test interrogation.7 9
The Court further reasoned that the Miranda warnings had served
their purpose as a procedural safeguard and another reading of
them between the polygraph and the post-test interrogation was not
required. 0 With the Miranda warnings having been sufficiently
given, and the Edwards initiation requirement having been met, the
defendant could then waive his fifth amendment rights.8 The
Supreme Court determined that the defendant had made a valid
waiver of his right to have counsel present at both the polygraph test
and the subsequent post-test interrogation.8 2 The waiver was valid
for the post-test interrogation as long as the questioning had not
become coercive, or circumstances had not changed so that the de-
fendant's answers were no longer voluntary and the waiver no
longer knowing and intelligent.8 3 According to the Court, the cir-
cumstances had not changed. Several decisions were cited which
had held that the use of polygraph results did not make post-test
questioning coercive.84 Based on the totality of the circumstances,
the defendant had made a valid waiver of his right to have counsel
present.85 His statements regarding sexual intercourse with the vic-
tim were thus admissible.8 6
Justice Marshall, the only dissenter, 87 argued that the defend-
ant had initiated the encounter for the polygraph test only and not
for the post-test questioning. 8 Marshall distinguished the initiation
for a polygraph test from initiation of an ordinary conversation with
police because of the limited purpose of the initiation for the poly-
graph test.89 He pointed out that there would normally be no expec-
tation of post-test interrogation since the answers from the post-test
78. Id.
79. Id. at 395.




84. E.g., United States v. Little Bear, 583 F.2d 411, 414 (8th Cir. 1978); Keiper v. Cupp,
509 F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Barreto, 256 Cal. App. 2d 392, 64 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1967); State v. Henry, 352 So. 2d 643 (La. 1977).
85. Wyrick, 103 S. Ct. at 397.
86. Id.
87. Id. Justice Stevens filed a brief concurring opinion at page 397.




interrogation, unlike the polygraph results, would be admissible.90
Since the defendant had initiated the encounter for the test only,
and not for the subsequent interrogation, he could not have made a
valid waiver of his right to counsel because the Edwards initiation
requirement had not been met.9'
Wyrick is a further development of the Court's previous deci-
sion regarding the admissibility of confessions. The Court's ruling
is significant because it expands, or at least clarifies, the initiation
requirement of Edwards. Under Wyrick the defendant's initiation
for the polygraph test, the results of which are inadmissible, is also
an initiation for post-test interrogation with the defendant's answers
admissible. Wyrick also exemplifies the borderline circumstances
under which a valid waiver of fifth amendment rights can be
found.92
The true future significance of Wyrick will depend upon
whether subsequent cases apply it narrowly within its own facts or
view it as a broad decision. The courts might apply the reasoning of
Wyrick to similar problems. For example, a defendant may agree
to talk about one crime but subsequently be questioned about an-
other crime. Further, a defendant may agree to a mental examina-
tion and be asked to answer questions about an offense other than
the one related to the examination. A defendant may also submit to
a polygraph test for one offense and be asked about others, or the
facts may differ from Wyrick so that the questioning is coercive.
Wyrick recognized and protected the defendant's rights and
also prevented an unnecessary burden from being imposed on po-
lice. The Court seems to have struck a fair balance between the
important need to protect the rights of the accused and the need for
police interrogation. Courts may need to use caution in applying
Wyrick to future cases in order to insure that this same balance is
maintained and that the interests of both sides are fairly protected.
Scott J Lancaster
90. Id. at n.2.
91. Id. The dissent also argued that the sixth amendment right to counsel should have
been considered by the majority as a possible constitutional violation, and that the major-
ity's analysis should not have been limited to the fifth amendment. Id. at 398-400.
92. On remand the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant had also
made a valid waiver of his sixth amendment right to counsel. Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d at
880.
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